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GREAT POWERS DIFFER ON APPROACH TO WORLD SECURITY

SAN FRANCISCO.—Perhaps the most incredible aspect of a war that at every turn has exceeded the bounds of the imaginable both in brutality and heroism is that its impending termination—at least in Europe—has the effect of an anticlimax. There should be dancing in the streets at the fall of Berlin, the liberation of North Italy. But millions of people saw the great military victory of 1918 dissipated in bickering and frustration. Before 1939 they were reluctant to wage another war. Now they are on guard against expecting too much from the peace and, as British Foreign Secretary Eden remarked, they feel that "there's a job of work to be done."

The atmosphere in which the job of building the machinery of international organization is being undertaken is not that of exaltation, but of grim determination to succeed. In spite of San Francisco's dramatic setting of cerulean-blue sky, dizzying hills, and breath-taking harbor, the conference so far has been entirely—perhaps to some extent purposely—lacking in glamor or emotion. There are here no Wilsons, Lloyd-Georges, or Clemenceaus. There are no Roosevelts.

GREAT POWERS CHART COURSE. The four great powers that sponsored the conference—the United States, Britain, Russia and China—have vied with each other in assuring the world of their unstinted devotion to the task of establishing an international organization which, in the words of Clement Attlee at a press conference, could perform both the negative function of preventing war and the positive task of alleviating the economic and social conditions that lead to war. But there are interesting variations in the main points urged by spokesmen for the Big Four. President Truman, in his speech opening the conference, as in his address to Congress, stressed the responsibility of great powers not to use force except in defense of law. Great powers, he

emphasized, must serve, not dominate small nations. They must be "good neighbors." On behalf of China, which has become the mouthpiece of small nations in their demand for peace based on justice—not merely peace—T. V. Soong pleaded for the creation of legal order.

Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov, repeatedly expressing Russia's sincere determination to participate in an international organization, dwelt on the incapacity of the League of Nations to prevent World War II, and on the need for giving the United Nations organization adequate military force that could be used promptly against an aggressor. Arguments about the rights of small nations or sovereign equality of all peoples, he said, should not become pretexts to weaken the machinery outlined at Dumbarton Oaks. Elsewhere he reiterated Russia's conviction that the great powers which have borne the burdens of war should be the ones to steer the world in the post-war period. British Foreign Secretary Eden, who deeply stirred the audience in the vast Opera House, expressed best of all the sentiments of his listeners when he declared that the great powers can make a two-fold contribution: by supporting international organization; and by setting up standards of international conduct and observing them in relations with other nations.

WHAT SMALL NATIONS HOPE FOR. It is the lack of standards—now that the Axis powers, as Mr. Eden pointed out, have deliberately debased such international morality as did exist in the past—that preoccupies small nations. Actually, at this conference, most of the small nations are those of Latin America. Only Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey are here to represent the small nations of Europe. Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark are absent because they did not declare war on the Axis.

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Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, as well as Italy, are absent because they fought on the Axis side. Poland is not here because the Big Three have been unable to agree on the composition of its government. France, now in the throes of recovering the confidence and prestige it lost in the debacle of 1940, still seems to hesitate between championship of the small nations against the great powers, and return to great-power rank. For what France wants to obtain in the peace settlement—control of the Rhineland and return of Indo-China—can be achieved only with the aid of the great powers.

The lack of standards of international conduct in the relations of the great and small nations would have been less alarming if it had proved possible, before this conference, to reach an agreement about the government of Poland. There has been a tendency, natural under the circumstances, to regard Russia's attitude on this problem as arbitrary and unyielding. Yet the admission of Argentina to the conference has given a curious twist to the Polish question. For if the Warsaw provisional government is regarded as undemocratic, the Farrell government

has been also so described by Washington—and its character has not been altered by a last-minute declaration of war on the Axis powers. Moreover, if Argentina, which claimed to be neutral throughout the war, is admitted, why exclude Sweden and Switzerland? Neutrality can take different colorations—and that of the Argentine dictatorship was distinctly pro-Axis. And then how justify the absence of Denmark, whose people have courageously resisted Germany with all the means at their disposal?

It is true that in the case of Poland an agreement was reached at Yalta to broaden the base of the provisional régime. The fulfillment of this agreement is now at issue. And there is a tendency on the part of the small nations to scrutinize Russia's good faith and intentions with even more skepticism than those of other great powers. But in the days ahead, which may be filled with controversy, it would be well to bear in mind that Russia—if perhaps less concerned with the niceties of diplomatic usages—is not essentially different in its great-power manifestations from Britain and the United States.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

DE GAULLE POLICIES INCUR GROWING CRITICISM

The unexpected return of Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain to France, on April 26, and the disagreement between French and American military authorities over the question of whose troops should occupy Stuttgart, throw into bold relief some of the problems confronting General de Gaulle's government as it attempts to maintain unity at home and insure France an important position abroad. Since the liberation of France last summer, de Gaulle has consistently minimized political rifts among Frenchmen in order to secure national solidarity, and relied on a lone-hand policy in winning his points with Washington and London. But now it seems that the provisional régime in Paris will be obliged in the near future to revise its course of action in both domestic and foreign affairs.

PETAÏN—THREAT TO UNITY. It is so often said of French political trials that they are new versions of the Dreyfus case that the comparison has lost much of its force. But the trial for treason that the former Chief of State at Vichy will face some time this summer may well uncover social and ideological divisions similar to those involved in *l'Affaire Dreyfus*, when the entire politically conscious public was split by the issue of authority versus personal liberty. For when the 89-year-old Marshal opens his defense, he will be speaking for the whole group of people in France who resigned themselves to defeat in 1940, either because they were convinced of their national weakness or frankly preferred an authoritarian state to a democracy in which the Left held an important position.

In Allied circles the Free French who refused to accept Pétain's defeatism and his National Revolution, based on an amalgam of fascist and old French monarchical principles, have become identified with the new France that has emerged from four years of enemy control. This is as it should be, for the Frenchmen who fought alongside the Allies are the hope of a progressive future for France. Yet many prominent industrial, political, educational and religious leaders who accepted Vichy's policies during the period of German occupation may not have revised their ideas. Instead, it seems likely that these groups have merely been silenced by Allied victories and await a more favorable opportunity to reappear on the political stage. Such an opportunity may be created by Pétain's trial, since it will be possible for those who supported the old Marshal's régime to argue that consideration for his age, his reputation as "the hero of Verdun," and his sincere intentions should win him an acquittal. If such a course were successful and the head of the Vichy government were permitted to go free or condemned to a penalty less than death, the whole purge program would be largely vitiated. It is, therefore, easily understandable that de Gaulle wanted Pétain tried *in absentia* and attempted to persuade the Swiss government not to admit him at the German border, on the ground that the French regarded him as a war criminal.

The fact that France is still in a kind of interregnum makes any threat to national unity particularly serious since the government cannot claim popular backing or constitutional support for the

measures it takes to maintain order. The municipal elections that were held throughout France on Sunday, April 29, and the second balloting two weeks hence, will do nothing to remedy this situation, for these polls will merely result in the selection of new local officials. Nevertheless, the fact that there has been a clear trend toward the Left, in Paris at least, may force de Gaulle to add more Socialists and Communists to his Cabinet and the Consultative Assembly.

FRANCE FACES ISOLATION. Pétain's case confronts the government at a moment when the basic question of the form France's future economic life will take is still unanswered. Before liberation, de Gaulle identified himself with the demand of the resistance forces that the great sources of the nation's wealth should belong to the state. Following his return to France, however, the General restricted provisional nationalization to the coal mines of northern France, and he has resisted considerable pressure from the Left for a definite declaration of economic policy along revolutionary lines. In so doing, he has incurred sharp criticism from the very groups that formerly filled the ranks of his strongest adherents and has found no adequate substitute for the support of these organizations.

That it has been possible for de Gaulle to continue as the unquestioned leader of France under these circumstances is due, above all, to past successes in foreign policy. But today the General's diplomacy is suffering widespread attacks in France, and he is charged with having led the nation into isolation. That the French are, in fact, in an isolated position there can be little doubt. For de Gaulle built his foreign policy almost exclusively on the treaty with Russia, signed on December 10. He was apparently unprepared for Moscow's rebuke, early in March, to the French Foreign Office for its refusal to

join in sponsoring the San Francisco Conference until the relationship between the Franco-Soviet pact and the proposed world security council had been clarified. As a result of this indication that Russia was unwilling to disturb the unanimity of the Big Three for the sake of an air-tight security pact with France, many Frenchmen are drawing the conclusion that France would be wise to come to a closer understanding with the other great powers. There is in this reaction a touch of opportunism that may prevent the successful adjustment of French foreign policy. But mere opportunism need not form the basis for closer ties between France and the Western powers, for there are solid interests that bind the French to Britain and the United States as well as to Russia. It is possible that the need of all four nations to cooperate closely in the occupation of Germany may help emphasize that fact. At any rate, France must reach an agreement with Britain and the United States, as well as with Russia, concerning the German zone it is to occupy, or difficulties similar to that arising at Stuttgart will greatly complicate the entire task confronting the Allies in Germany.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

A War Atlas for Americans, prepared with the assistance of the Office of War Information. New York, Simon and Schuster, for Council of Books in Wartime, 1944. \$1 paper; \$2.50 cloth.

Uses the orthographic instead of Mercator projection. A most interesting method of presenting the history of the war by maps and accompanying texts.

Faith, Reason and Civilization, by Harold J. Laski. New York, Viking Press, 1944. \$2.50

A plea from the veteran English socialist writer that the world must adopt the "Russian Idea," much as the declining Roman Empire accepted Christianity. Although the "Russian Idea" is inadequately defined in this work, the author has displayed his usual erudition in drawing the analogy between that idea and early Christianity.

A Guide to Naval Strategy, by Bernard Brodie, completely revised edition. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1944. \$2.75

Fortunately, at this time of keenest interest in our Navy and its far-flung operations, there comes this book, addressed primarily to laymen. The author quotes with relish Clemenceau's saying that war is too important to be left to the generals, and he sets out to give a simple, sound and most readable guide to naval strategy. Even in this time of war censorship he takes us behind the curtain with many hitherto unpublicized incidents of recent naval operations right up to D-Day.

Middle East Diary, by Noel Coward. Garden City, Doubleday, Doran, 1944. \$2.00

Using the war as a backdrop the actor-playwright does a rather charming, slight tale of his performances in the Middle East. His facility in phrasemaking makes him at times dash off thoughtless remarks to which people often give more importance than they rate.

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
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Washington News Letter



INFLUENCE OF THE NAVY ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Since the world powers are planning to keep the peace by armed force, the era of international relations now being charted at San Francisco will provide a crucial test of whether Allied states can maintain great peacetime military forces without alarming one another. Proposing to discourage by cooperation aggressive states from fomenting war, the powers still display uncertainty as to whether the more important task for the armed forces of each state will be to enhance its individual security by its own action, or contribute to the general scheme of cooperative security. In the United States, the problem of which point of view will prevail centers on the Navy.

THE NAVY AND NEWS FACILITIES. The United States Navy is larger today than the war fleets of all other countries combined. Its officers and civilian officials favor retention of a great establishment after the war. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, in his annual report on February 20, said that the United States should retain "the weapons with which to fight if we must—because the means to conduct war must be in the hands of those who hate war." Supposedly, the Navy's role is to share in execution of foreign policy devised by other agencies of the Administration, but lately it has been using its influence in actually shaping this policy.

Two outstanding instances relate to telecommunications and bases. On March 19 Secretary Forrestal and Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman proposed to a subcommittee of the Interstate Commerce Committee that Congress enact a law requiring the merger of all American-owned international communications facilities under a corporation which the Federal government would organize and partially control through its appointment of 5 of the 20 directors. Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Democrat of Montana and chairman of the committee, objected that such an arrangement would jeopardize the freedom to transmit news between this and other countries. The Navy proposal came at a time when this country was considering the possibility of seeking a convention for the international guarantee of freedom to gather and disseminate news, and after the United States had argued with success for free competition in international aerial communication at the Chicago air conference.

PACIFIC BASES. The issue of how much influence military and naval thinking will have on political policy during the coming years is especially pronounced in the matter of bases. In the Pacific, the

United States has taken from Japan islands in the Marshalls, Marianas and Caroline groups. On April 9 Representative George H. Mahon, Democrat of Texas, introduced a bill in the House directing the United States to claim permanently any former Japanese island wrested by our forces. The bill, it was assumed, reflected the view of Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, who had said: "Failure to maintain bases essential for our defense raises the fundamental question—how long can the United States afford to continue a cycle of fighting and building and winning and giving away, only to fight and build and win and give away again?"

The State Department, on the other hand, held that this country should keep Pacific bases not for itself but as the trustee of all the United Nations. If the claim is allowed that the islands belong to us because we liberated them, some validity would be given to a claim by Russia that it should dominate Poland, which the Red armies liberated. And it is possible that peace might be endangered, rather than served, if this country had absolute control over a chain of islands which were fortified steppingstones from North America to a part of Asia in which the Soviet Union has a direct interest.

Reports from San Francisco on April 27 declare that the United States has devised a plan for distinguishing between "strategic bases" and other colonial territories. In the former, the trustee power would have virtually complete sovereignty, although a base might be open to use by more than one power and the United Nations organization would possess certain rights of inspection. In so-called non-strategic areas, the governing authority would have a far greater responsibility to the world body and would be expected to conform to certain standards of colonial rule.

Another instance of official action on questions raised by the Navy occurred on April 13, when Assistant Secretary of State Will C. Clayton said that the State Department opposed a full monopoly over telecommunications. Moreover, the Navy has reduced its building program. On March 6 Admiral King announced that 84 new fighting ships would be constructed; on March 12 he said this number had been reduced to 12. The following day Secretary Forrestal declared the curtailment order had come from James F. Byrnes, then Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

BLAIR BOLLES

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